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Introduction
As of earry 2015, it has been srightry 
"I-": four years since the Arab springmovement began sweeping t# urNa *g.;^ ffiil p."ai.tions ofMiddle Easr events t ur"'u-t-fuy.'i"""i,ro.rr,,iih; h;r;"". especiary thecase with regard 
. 
to events'associated with the;;;-sp.ing and itsaftermarh' A samoring orp."ai.,i#:;r* that many were way wide of themark'-the *onuirhi""' 
.";;d ;;;rriy ,r".,r.,.o*n, a"-o..u.y wourd befinally estabrished tlroogl,oui;:iGJ"r economic growth wourd becomeffi 
"'l*:i1l;#j.""*,:Hl fffi , berween,r, x',,.",',ng au rocra, i c
, 
*?; "J:;' :: :: Jin: T* ffi Ti #Ti::*l:T t' : wh.r e is,h a,eco n o m ic serrings. o n" .or, til, "*, ;::,Tr"#.1' :"T:,ffI, Tly';:.';fo-1S""3"s groupings. From *, 
";;;;are ofren divided r,lu,i*" i"^"r_::.::il:_rc perspective MENA countries
*.h,"o.h,";;;."."$ilH,f :;:,ffi :ffi ff..,T::L:XH:#i[:]hand feel more ."Tl:i*," f;iil;'?n 
, 
resrme type_democracy, orautocratic to provide insighr as to rhe Juti.ut forces driving evenrs.
.;l|:';:lllixiJ; ij;ll;i,;1,;,fl':,1.'lj;:,I-il Navar p,sr(iradua,e s,h,.r in Monrerey,
i:fi :#:,';,t,,.TIji*' j,i,{}:f,i,,::fr lli;;#}:d,fil*n:i1:,r"lnl*U,;
. 
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A second, and related, reason that may account for^ the rash of poor
p;;;r;;;t of Arab Spttigt"ttomes is the tendency to focus either on the
political' or economiJ fo'I"to playing out' For many observers' 
the secular
decline in governance,, and the increase in corruption, crony capitalism"
togetherwiththepromiseofdemocracywas."",,u.thedrivingforceinthe
uprisings.Others*havestressedthateconomicissueswerefundamentally
J;;;"ilp;*ur,_6lr. of integration into the gtobal economy" high
unemployment, inaiility to uniertake comprehen'it'" "to,,ott'ic 
reforms""
underdevelopment of private :."tto1 utti'ity"' failure.to develop 
a
competitive .rrrrrotutio'ilf'"tto'"' and the resulting widening income 
and
wealth inequalities and th-e failure to converge" with the more 
advanced
counties all .reatediie conditions for the "pii'it'gt' -Td q1u 
long way in
explaining .rrUr"q,'""t developments' A to-pl"t" list of forces at work
prior and aft"r 20tiare beyo"d the scope of ti'i' Paper' However' the 
left
iortion of Figure 1 summarizes the more 
important ones'
As the following Jo.r. show, a blending of the economic and political
explanations into a political economy 
"upptoath provides a useful
framework fo, t a.kir,gi understanding and asiessing events 
in the region'
,cf.MarkLynched.,TtuArabuprisingsExpkineil:TheNewcontentiowPolitiaintheMiddle
Eas4 (New Yo.k, Cotumll U'i""it"y f'"tt' ZOr+)' and Marc Lylth' The,Arab 
t]prising: The
Unfinished Reaolutioru ii' ll'AnEast' (N"* York Public Affairs Press' 2013)'




Kadhim ed., Goaernanei iriii l'laau n^t and North Africa: A Hanlboo( (London: Routledge'
'0,'i)r,ro.rro Nucifora, Erik churchill and Bob Rijkers, "cronyism, comrption, and the 
Arab
Sorins: The Case of funl.iu" in Index of Econlmic Freedom 2015 
(Washington: Heritage
i5ffir""' zots). http'uu*ww'heritage'org/index/booVchapter-4
*Mohsin Khan, The Economic consequence. or *r" Ar.b sp.ing, The Atlantic 
council'
February 201a, http:/ /www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/the-economic-con.
seouences-o[-the-arab-sPring






































,,Robert Springborg, itt" p."".u.ioos Economics of Arab Springs," sumiaal 53:.6
'::i*"i'rlll*o-r, *The political Economy of the Arab Spring," Meriterranean Politia



































Operationally, and fully recognizing the uniqueness of each nation state,
this proposed grouping places countries into one of three distinct groups:
(a) gulf monarchies',, (b) countries classified by the IMF as Arab countries
in tansition (ACT countries) countriesri, and (c) autocratic regimes','.
Of particular interest are the ACT countries. The IMF considers these
countries as those in which the effects of the Arab Spring have been more
disruptive, producing a period of political transition. They include Egypt,
Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, whose regimes have been reversed. rne iMr
also places Jordan and Morocco, both monarchies marked by constitu-
tional reforms, have also been included in the ACT group. Countries in the
ACT group were all profoundly affected by the revolutionary wave of 2011,
and their economies are going through a difficult phase of adjustment.
Moving away from 2011, the ACT countries along with the other two
groupings appear to be experiencing fairly unique patterns of economic
growth, governance structures, and economic freedom. In turn, these
factors provide valuable insights to many of the forces at work producing
change in the region. The general pattern has been one of consolidation
and growth for the oil monarchies, while the autocratic countries are
experiencing stagnation, declining governance structures, reversal of
economic freedoms, and potential instability.
Several countries,Jordan, Morocco and Algeria fall into an intermediate
regime, each with the potential of transitioning into either the growth or
stagnation groupings. Drawing on the key patterns in each of our three
main groupings, an attempt will be made to identify the factors that must
be present for Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria to graduate to the growth
group-the right-hand portion of Figure l.
'oP. Gregory Gause II, Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle Easfs Monarchies Suruiued the
Arab Spring (Washington Brookings, September 20lB)
'nArab countries in Tiansition: Economic outlook and Key challenges, washington
IMF, octobet 9,2014. http:,//www.imf.orglexternal /rry/pp/engi2Ol4ll00g14.pdf
r"Timo Kivimaki, "Democracy, Autocrats and U.S. Policies-in the Middle East,,, Middle
East PoliE XIX:l Spring 2012
Figure 1
The Arab Spring: Causes and Consequences
scial
Tabk 1





































E"orrimi. $owth in the MENA region both in the pre-Arab Springyea_rs
(2005-2010) Ind the post-years (2011-2014) has been mixed (Table 1). In
particular, the oil flronarchies have experienced the highest and most
ionsistent patterns of economic expansion (here measured by constant
price gross domestic product, GDP). In general.their rates of expansion
irur" i"".r slightly slower at 5.30/o (vs 6.50/o earlier) in the post-Arab Spring
years, but there are exceptions, with Kuwait and the UAE experiencing
irigh", rates of growth in ihe 2}ll-t4 years than in the years leading up to
the Arab Spring.
Data Source: lMF, wEO D-:?3
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Tabk 1
MENA: Annual Growth in GDP
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A completely different picture emerges in the ACT countries. Here,
domestic and external shocks resulted in significantly poorer performance
(1.90/0) than in the earlier period (5.20n1. For the most part, these countries
faced greater political turmoil and social unrest than the other two country
groupings. The result was loss of foreign investment confidence, decreased
tourism, and increased budget deficits and current account shortfalls
leading to a sharp fall-off in growth. Specially growth declined to an
average of 1.90/0 for 20ll-14 versus 5.2010 over the 2005-10 period. The
largest decline was in Yemen, a country experiencing considerable
instability, while Morocco, a country with relative peace, experienced the
smallest downturn in growth (3.90/o vs q.60lo).
With the notable exception of Syria, the Autocratic regimes were able to
quell internal unrest. However, their economies have declined sharply in
the post-Arab era, falling to 1.00/o rate of economic growth compared with






oration of the economies in their immediate neighborhood played a
significant role in this regard.
Rates of investment have also varied considerably from one group to
another (Table 2). In the pre-Arab spring years both the oil monarchies and
autocratic regimes had similar rates of capital formation at around 27010 of
gross domesiic product (GDP). The ACT countries had somewhat lower
iates at 24olo. However, in the post Arab Spring years, investment has fallen
to 22.60lo in the Arab Oil monarchies as they re-oriented their budgets
toward providing more subsidies and services to their populations.
Tabk 2
MENA: Tbtal Inuestment (ohGDP)
2072 2013 2014 Average2010
than the overail-rate.
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Data Sourcei lMF, WEO Database, JanuarY 2015
On the other hand, the autocratic regimes increased their rates of
investment to 31.30/o of GDP in an effort to sustain higher rates of economic
growth in the face of deteriorating governance and economic freedom'
Uncertainty, and heightened political risk in the ACT countries was no
doubt a factor in investment declining to 20.60/o for this STouP'
One of the main factors precipitating the Arab Spring was high and
chronic rates of unemployment. Unemployment figures are of notoriously
poor quality in the MENA region. Also the aggregate figures reported here
io roibr"ut out youth unemployment which is usually considerably higher
(;
gLborhood played a
7 from one group to
!e oil monarchies and
























than the overall-rate. With these caveats in mind, there are still several
rough patterns that distinguish the three country groupings (Table 3).
Tabk 3
MENA: Unemployment Rate (0/o kbor force)
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Data Source: lMF, WEO Database, Januaary 2015
For the Arab Oil monarchies, overall unemployment rates are by far the
lowest, averaging 3.80/o and 3.70lo respectively in the pre-and post-Arab
spring years. Saudi Arabia has the highest rate decreasing from 5.7olopre- to
5.60/o in the post-Arab Spring era.
Ironically, the ACT countries have had an increase in unemployment in
recent years. For this groupr unemployment increased from ll.40lo in the
pre-Arab Spring years to 12.60lo post-Arab spring. Tunisia has had the
highest rates of unemployment increase, rising to 16.60/o in the post Arab
spring period from 12.60/o previously. Morocco the lowest rate at 9.10/o
falling from 9.7010 pre-Arab Spring.
Of the factors facilitating steady sustained growth, governance, experiences
significant differences between the three groups (Figure 2) Aggregating the
world Bank's individuar Governance Indices of: voice and accountabirity,political stability/absence of viorence, government effectiveness, reguratoryquality, rule of Iaw and contror of imrption into an totar governancesummary measure produces a striking pattern (Figure 2).
Figure 2










1996. \iVhile the ar
been closing the t
efforts in this area
Figure 3

































Data Source: World Bank, Governance lndicators.2Ol4
since 1996, the start of the series, the oir monarchies have, given severalups and downs, shown a slight long-run improvemertri., go.,r"-ance. Thisgroups scores are considerably above those of the ACT coirntries who holda similar Iead over the autociatic regimes. However, since r99g there hasbeen a secular decline in governa.ri" i, the ACT countrilstarting in 2002 the autocratic regimes arso have had a 
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Again, three distinctive patterns in the MENA region have developed
over time (Figure 3). The oil monarchies have significantly higher levels of
government effectiveness than two other groups. Furthermore, starting
around 2005 this group has seen a secular strengthening in this area. By
contrast the ACT countries have seen a long term secular decline in
government effectiveness, with levels today considerably below those in
1996. \,\hile the autocratic countries significantly lag in this area, they had
been closing the gap with the ACT countries. However since 201l, their
efforts in this area have declined sharply.
Figure 3





- - Authoritarian Regimes
A broadly similar picture (Figure 4) emerges when examining changes in
economic freedom over time. Following the Heritage Institute approach
the economic freedom index is a summery measure of progress made in
eleven reform areas: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom,
government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial
freedom, property rights, and freedom from cormption and labor freedom.
In general reforms leading to greater reliance on market forces and less





























MENA Patterns of Economic Freedom by Country Grouping
2008 2010 20'12 2014




- - Authoritarian Regimes
Again the oil monarchies score the highest, followed by the ACT
countries, with the autocratic regimes with consistently the lowest rankings.
As in the case with govelnance, the oil monarchies have maintained theil
scores over time, with perhaps a slight decrease in their rankings over the
1996-2014 period.
The ACT countries following a secular deterioration in economic
freedom from 1997 to 2006 experienced a fairly sharp improvement in
economic freedom up to the time of the Arab Spring. Since 2011 however,
scores have again began to fall.
Finally, the autocratic regimes exPerienced a sharp improvement in
economic freedom in the early 2000s, leveling off in 2006. Since the
Arab Spring unrest, however this group has seen a sharp fall in its
economic freedom.
Empirical studiesrT suggest that improvement in governance by laying a
solid foundation for growth tend to precede improved rates of economic
"Cf. Rock-Antoine Mehana, "Governance and Economic Development in MENA
Countries: Does Oil Affect the hesence of a Virtuous Circle"" Journal of Tianslational






































Data Source: letathLT _i_-'.
''Legatum Inst:--Ll
growth. Similarly, improved levels of economic freedom through facili-
tating increased efficiency of resource usage also lead to highei rates of
economic growth.
The Legatum Institute Prosperity Index'' provides a useful data set for
iooking past governance and economic freedom in order to identify a series
of factors also associated with growth and development-the broader
institutional determinants aspects of growth. In addition to governance and
the performance of the economr, the index is comprised of entrepre-
neurship and opportunity, education, health, safety and security, pe.sonal
freedom and social capital. Countries are ranked from l-140 on each
dimension with I the highest level and 140 the lowest.
Again our three country groupings show some striking differences in the
manner in which they have evolved since the start of the Arab Spring
(Table a). The economy dimension is a composite of a number of factori
usually associated with a vibrant economy: it includes among other
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Data Source: Letathum lnstitute, Prosperity lndex, 201O. 2014
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;;;i"? this period, the ACTs experienced the largest deterioration in
rankingsfallingfrorrru,,averageof'Og'Oto98'8'Theautocraticregimesdid
not suffer quite as ,"r"." d".iir", but their average ratings still fell from
98.5 to 108.3.
TheLegatummeasure,.,ofgovernanceonthehorizontalaxisincludesa
score of factors ,i*iiu, to thJse in the World Bank's Governance Indices
database.InadditionLegatumincisessuchfactorsas:effortstoaddress
p.""rry, .orfid"r." it' thJjudicial system' and confidence in the military'
overall the oil *onu..hi""s 
"*p"ri"r."d a slight 
dedln3 in this measure
of governar,." arriig tf'" f"t'-'l'rab Spring perlo{, while, both the ACT
countriesandAuthoritarianregimesu,r"rug"dudeclineof24.Spositionsin
the country .""ki";;.1;;Jur"und Moroio faired the best in the ACT
'uA full description of the l'egatum indices
Prosperity lndex. http ://www'prosperi ty'com/ # 
t' /
t2



































group with Jordan falling only 16 places and Morocco moving up in the
rankings eleven places. Algeria was the leader of the autocratic countries
seeing their ranking fall by only 13 places
The Legatum measure of entrepreneurship incorporates such diverse
elements as R&D expenditure, business startup costs, the environment for
entrepreneurship and an infrastructure network oriented to supporting
entrepreneurial activity.
The oil monarchies have experienced a slight decline in entrepre-
neurship during the post 2011 period, followed by the ACTs with a
moderate (tl.tl positions) decline and the autocratic regimes with a major
decline of I8.3 positions.
The Legatum measure of social capital incorporates elements of trust in
others, views on reliability of others, as well as helping strangers, donations,
and volunteering. Social capital is critical for the functioning of a market
economy, because without broad-based trust, many transactions are
confided to the local geographical area or within tribes.
Here, a somewhat different pattern emerges. Instead of the falloff in
social capital growing from the oil monarchies to the ACT countries and
the autocratic regimes, the ACT countries had the greatest decline in social
capital, with Tunisia losing 85 places in the country ranking. Algeria only
declined by 5 places, while Jordan and Morocco experienced declines of
3ll and 40 places respectably
In sum, not only have the ACT and autocratic counties seen their
economic positions decline, but perhaps more importantly the factors,
governance, entrepreneurship and social capital. These elements which
might have facilitated economic recovery after 2011 have declined, and in
many cases at a rapid rate.
While the numbers tell a story, the significance of these shifts can be best
seen in plots of several of the variables against each other, and then making
a comparison of the situation in 2010 with that in2014. Again, the Legatum
index ranks countries from 1 (the highest) to t+0 (the lowest). As expected,
in 2010 the oil Monarchies scored well on the economy and governance
dimensions (Figure 5), and were clustered towards the origin. Similarly,
many of the Autocratic countries scored low on both dimensions and were
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Legatum Governance (1 highest,142 lowest)
Data Source: Legatum ProsPerity lndex 2010
The countries that were to become the ACT SouP exhibited more
variety with trgypt and Yemen exhibiting characteristics of the Autocratic
,egi*Ls, while"Tunisia and Morocco more like the oil monarchies. Two
countries were outliers,Jordan and Algeria. BecauseJordan lies above the
linear trend line, it a:ppears to be underachieving economically-the
governance structures uie th"r", but the expected ecolomic performance
i, ,,ot. Similarly, Algeria lies below the linear trend line suggesting its
economic performa.r"ce is somewhat better than usually supported by l1s
level of governances. Clearly other factors, such as oil revenues in Algeria's
case, account for these Patterns.
By 20La changes in governance and economic performance had
seplrated the twJclusterslven further (Figure 6) with now three countriesjolJu.,, Tunisia and Algeria in, something of an intermediate range. One
"por.ibi" explanation is ihat both vicious and virtuous circles are operating'
'For the good go,r"rnance/economic performance grouP' increased
government expenditures, and reform consolidation are sustaining
E.or,omi. growtil and laying the foundation for further reforms' For the
poo, go,n"Lance/economic- performance grouP, increased uncertainty,
ialling"levels of investment and increased unemployment are creating an
environment of deeper uncertainty. By this interpretation, Jordan, Algeria
t4
and Tirnisia are possibly at a point
improved governance and future
economic stagnation.
where they could go in either direction-
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For many observers, the inability of the MENA countries to create jobs
and become better integrated into the world economy stems from the fact
that the private sector is very underdeveloped in most countries. Related to
this is the fact that the manufacturing sector, usually a major source of job
creation in developing economies is greatly underdeveloped compared with
other regions of similar incomes. Compounding the problem is the fact that
the governments have more often than not taken the lead in investing and
production through state enterprises. While governments have tended to
pull back in recent years, there has not been a significant increase in private
sector production outside of the oil monarchies. One of the factors limiting
the private sector is limitations on entrepreneurial activity. Again deficient







Plotting the Legatum data on entrepreneurship and governance for 2010
prodo""." anothJr pattern dominated by two 
-fairly . distinct 
groupings
[U*r" 7). The firsi characterized by good rankings in governance and
"nir"pr"r"rrship 
includes the oil monarchies plus Jordan' Morocco and
Tunisia, while the second grouping clusters the autocratic countries along
with ACT countries, U'fpi urrd Y"--"tr. Most countries are near the trend
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By20|4,thedeclinesingovernanceandentrepreneurshipinMorocco,
Joriu, and Tunisia had seiarated them between the oil monarchies 
and
autocratic groups of countries' At the same time' their declines did not
match those of the autocratic grouP, with the distance separating them







































Ranking Legatum Governance (1 highest, 142 lowest)
Data Source: Legatum Prosperity lndex, 2014
The relationship between governance and social capital is not as strong
as that between governance and entrepreneurship or governance and the
economy. Still, some interesting patterns with implications for future
economic performance have emerged in the MENA region. In 2010 the
MENA countries formed two broad groups-those with relatively good
rankings in governance and somewhat better rankings in social capital and
those with poor levels of both (Figure 9). Morocco was a member of the
high ranking countries while Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen were
members of the lower ranking group. Sudan was the one outlier at the time
with very good social capital. The oil monarchies and Morocco had very
good levels of social capital given their governance, while the autocratic
countries a number of Act countries had lower than anticipated social
capital given their governance. Tellingly, all of the countries that were to
experience regime change or high levels of domestic violence in 2011 had
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To sum up: excepl ic
is little to sholv for rh'
By 2014, declining levels of governance and social capital again separated
the two main groups even further, but withJordan and Morocco now in an
intermediate group between the low and high ranking countries (Figure
10). During this time, the pattern between governance and social capital
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The patterns of the economy, governance, entrepreneurship and social
capital and the clustering of two relatively divergent groupings is
suggestive of virtuous and vicious circles at work. A working hypothesis
might be constructed as follows: for the good performers high levels of
governance have helped maintain good economic performance through
creating incentives for entrepreneurship in a more cooperative/trusting
setting. In turn, entrepreneurs may have exerted pressure on the
government for further reforms or at least fought against the tendency of
governments to backtrack on governance and economic freedom during a
period of high uncertainty.
In contras! low and declining levels of governance have tended to
constrain growth in the poor performing countries. Governance levels and
social capital have not been strong enough to support a vigorous entrepre-
neurial class and growing markets. With no strong interest group advocaiing
reforms, governments in these countries have let governance and economic
freedom decline, and with the decline, poorer economic' performance,
contracting entrepreneurship, and eroding social capital have followed.
To sum up: except for some progress towards democracy in Tirnisia there




factors in the AcT countries and autocratic regimes responsible for the
,rfririrg in the first place, rather than improving, have significantly deteri-
orated"since 2011. On the other hand, ihe oil monarchies have not only
maintained levels of governance and economic freedom, but have for the
most part started been taking reforms, both political and economic' more
."i.""fy. Progress has slow,-but at least it has been in the right direction,
and witl it sdbility and good economic performance'
Tirrning Points
Asnotedearlier,severalcountriesmaybeataturningpoint-poisedto
begin reforms anj gradrully converge the growilg qo"P' or prepared to
pJr,por" reforms uid ."" their economies gradually descend and stagnate,
o, 
"*p"ri"rce regime 
change along the way' Yemen 11d Syria have 
already
met ihat fate, wiil the same-thing happen toJordan, Morocco or Algeria?
Jordanih" 
"rulyris 
above (Figures 4, 5) suggest that theJordanian economy has
been underperforming."specificully, economic performance is consid-
erably below what one"would expect given the Progress made in improved
go,r"rrur"". However a number tf factors can account for this discrepancy'
';o.du, has borne the brunt of the regional instability brought on by the
A"rab Spring. First, supplies of low-cost natural gas from Egypt were
disrupted bi sabotag", 
"trtirrg 
the kingdom billions to replace. Then, the
tourism trade was hil ;r fears-of ,nresfkept visitors away. Next, the Syrian
conflict has disrupted Jordan's trade with Turkey, adding significant
transport costs to many ofJordan's key exports,'
L additiorr, the country"has been flooded with refugees from the Syrian
conflict. It is unclear how many Syrian refugees are in the country, since
most are not in refugee .u*pr, but instead have made their way to cities
like Amman. TheJo-rdanian government has sometimes estimated that at
the beginning of 26t5 there were as many_as 1.4 million Syrians inJordan-
u .orrrirry of"less than 7 million people. of these, approximately 736,000
ur" ,"frrg""s, with perhaps 20 peicent of the refugees in camps'''
- 
.E,,- molet, Jordan: The Geopolitical seruia hoaider, (washington: Brookings
Institute, February iOiil t np,t twww.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/12/iotdar
geopolitical-service-comolet
,,Ian Black, ,,puti"rr." R.,nning out in Jordan After Influx of syrian Refugees," The
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The large influx of Syrian refugees has strained the government's ability
to deliver social services to Jordanians and increased social tensions and
competition for jobs, especially in northern cities. The US Agency for
International Development estimates that hosting the refugees will cost the
government about 900 million dollars in 201#).
The US plans to increase its annual aid toJordan to US$1bn a year from
the current US$660m to help it to pay for the cost of housing Syrian and
Iraqi refugees and the fight against Islamic State (IS), but even this amount
is far from the likely economic cost born by the country23.
The government's reform efforts, both economic and political have been
underway for years. These have resulted in steady improvements in
governance, economic efficiency and public participation. The country's
reform process began in the late 1980s when the country suffered a debt crisis
that necessitated the introduction of an IMF-supported stabilization program.
Prior to this program, the government had played the dominant role in the
economy controlling prices and undertaking all infrastructure development.
With the accession of King Abdullah II to the throne in 1999 the reform
process gained increased impetus. A number of programs to streamline the
bureaucrac/, reform the legal framework for business, improve the
effectiveness of the judiciary, upgrade education and vocational training,
and encourage investment have been instituted.
In terms of economics, the new agenda includes a series of innovative
programs designed to directly address many of the country's long-standing
impediments to prosperity and stability. AlthoughJordan's relatively strong
growth has helped create employment opportunities for both nationals and
expaf:iates, the official unemployment rate has hovered at 11"|0/o and the
unofficial rate at around 300/0. To absorb the anticipated annual flow of
around 60,000 new entrants into the labor force each year would require
annuar a real GDP growth of around 9O/o-nearly 60lo higher than recent
growth rates2'.
Given these stark realities, Jordan's development policy emphasizes the
developn,-rrt of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Smaller
businesses inJordan are a crucial part of the economy, especially in terms
?'Alina Romanowski, "ForJordan U.S. Support ()uaranteed," (Washington: USAID,.June
27 , 2014). http://blog.us aid.gov /2014/06/forjordan-u-s-support-guaranteed/
''"U.S. plans to boost aid toJordan to $1 billion pel- year, Reuters, l'ebruary ll, 2015.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/03/usjordan-aid-idUSKBNoLT2E'l'201s020:)
'lordan: Staff Replrt for the 2012 Article IV Consultation International Monetary Fund,(Washington, International Monetary Fund, 2012)
2t
of job provision, with sMEs accounting for around 400/o of GDP and 700/o
of'"*ploy-ent. In shorl Jordan has laid a solid foundation for private
.".to, u.ti.rrity, with a stead! improvement in governance and social capital
that would appear to support a major expansion in the small and medium
business sectofs.
In addition to creating jobs and improving incomes, sME development l
inJordan has the poteniat to expand-the_ country's middle-clast,,u"q,*tlh l
it,"political stability. Sara Tobin iound'o that the emergent middle class in
Amman and its sense of "aspiring cosmopolitanism" has reoriented key
groups of Jordanians away from failed political reforms..Her interviews
I"gg".t th"ut "-iddle-classness" and aspiring cosmopolitanism are an
"rriJrg"", 
means of constructing internal homogeneity' Despite the_r_eal
divides between economically globalized and culturally emergent West
Amman and the poor and *oikirg class Palestinians who occupy East
Amman, increasing numbers from the east are crossing into West Amman
for work and leisure. The result has been to create links between otherwise
varied segments of society, which increasingly share both common
experiences and similar visions of a prosperous future'
Despite these positive developments,Jordan's situation may be the most
pr""uiio* of th" monarchies. The country is resource Poor and situated
ih"r" many of the region's problems are actively playin_g_out. Still,Jordan
is far from joining iunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen' Even the
regime's *ort 'ro.ul critics frame their goal as- changing the system' not
orr"ert rning the monarchy. Most believe that the regime will pursue the
correct reforms, and the iime thus bought by the country's social capital
,rruy u" sufficient for many of the country's positive trends to prevail.
In short,Jordan is lun"S a solid foundation for stable economic growth'
If and wh"l the region-'s clnflicts subside, the country is in a good position
to take advantage of its reform efforts with a major expansion in economic
activity and the-reduction in unemployment. The country's prospects for
convergence towards the MENA good perforrnance SrouP aPPear good.
Morocco
The analysis above suggests that Morocco has made steady progress in
most areas critical to lorig-run growth and stability. Governance levels are
relatively high and havelmproved even further since 2011. In contrast to
'lordon's National Employment Strateg 2011-2020 (C'eneva, ILO, 201l)
,iSara A. Tobln, Jorda"rl's Arab Sp;rg' The Middle Class and Anti-Revolutiory" Middl'e
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. In contrast to
'.ttolution," Middl.e
Jordan, Morocco's economic performance has been consistent with its
progress in governance, not under or over performing. However there has
been a fall-off in entrepreneurship and a large decline in social capital
since 2011.
over the years Morocco had been able to accumulate by far the largest
stock of social capital in the Arab world, ranking l3th highest oi all
countries in this important dimension2'. No doubt this accumulation of trust
\!'as a key factor enabling Morocco to be the one country where protests
during the initial Arab Spring of early 2011 produced fundamental yet
ceaceful reform, and without regime change.
The country emerged from the Arab Spring with a new constitution that
cromises a more open political system and improved human rights. A
coalition government led by the Parti de la justice et du d6veloppement
PJD), which is inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and rurkey'i ruling
Justice and Development Party, enjoys popular support. Experienced
officials and business leaders keep the government and economy running.
The conservative kingdom has avoided the chaos that has engulfed *r.h
of the region.
This unusual combination of seemingly fundamental change combined
rvith aspects of stability has inspired loose talk by some Moroccan officials
about a supposed Moroccan "third way" of incremental Islamic democra-
rization2'. The implication is Morocco could be a model for other Arab
monarchies, or even beyond.
contrary to other Islamic parties, the JPD has espoused a neo-liberal
approach to economic policy-making". In establishing benchmarks for
Drogress, the PJD expresses considerable interest in the key indicators
employed in the world Economic Forum's Global competitiveness
Reports3", the World Bank's Doing Business Reporti,, and Tlansparency
International's comrption Perceptions Index". Indeed, the slogan "good
governance" appears more frequently in the PJD's electoral platforms than
in those of any other Islamist party.
'Tlegatum Institute, fuosperily Index, 2010 (London: Legatum Institute, 2010)
"Marina c)ttaway, Morocco: can the Third way succeed? (washington: carnegie,July 31,
2012) http:/ /carnegieendowment.org/2012/07 / Jl/morocco-can-third-way-succeed -
"valentina Bartolucci, "Morocco's silent Revolution," open Demouaq, Janrary 17, 2012.
h rtps://wwwopendemocracy.net/valentina-bartolucci/moroccos-silent-.Luolrtio.,
"'world Economic Forum, The Global competitiaeness Report 2074-2015, (Geneva, world
Economic Forum 2014).
"World Bank, Doing Business 2015 (Washington: World Bank, 2015).
" Corruptions Perception Index 2 01 4, tansparency International, 2014
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It turns out that the policies of the JPD are fairly consistent with the
Morocco's overall gro*it strategy for the past decade' The strategy can be
loosely characterizJd as "inclusiif gro*th)' with a focus on achievind" (u)
;;"; equal distribution of incoml; (b) a decrease in absolute poverty;.(c)
more equal opportunities, including access to basic services; and (d) a
higher level of emPloYmen
To the great surprise of many critics, the strategy has achieved some
notable successes. Over the past decade' approximately 1'7 million
Moroccans moved out of povert/, and the oveiall Poverty-rate decreased
bymorethan40Percent.Th",hu."ofthepopulationthall:llbeneaththe
,rltior*t poverty line decreased from aboui 16 percent in 1999 to less than
I ;";.""i in zoo8. While the reduction in poverty has been more or less
uniform between urban (about 50 percent) and rural areas (about 40
percent),highincomeinequalitypersistsandhasevenincreasedslightlyin
both urban and rural areas'
Follo*lr,g the outbreak of Moroccan protests and Arab Spring uprisings
in neighboring countries, the king announced the immediate implemen-
tation"of un ui."udy existing decJntralization develoPment strategy' The
social capital and'trust crfated by this announcement was a further
deterrent to local protests raging out of control'
Decentralization, which 1.urrsf".. managerial authority, skills and
capacities to sub-national levels, reflects the government's stated desire to
advance democracy from the bottom up. In terms of the economy, local
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while much of Morocco's model is unique to that country, key elements,
such as decentralized development pianning, might be successfully
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all matters involving the whole community); umma (a decentralized yet
integrated worldwide Muslim community that brings about human .lg'ht,
and social justice); and ijma (consensus-building).
According to the UNCTAD world Investment Reporti,r, Morocco ranked
Iirst in North Africa in terms of the nominal amount of fbreign direct
investment (FDI) it received in 20ll-i. The kingdom lured investment
inflows worth USD 3.(jbn in 20111. This good performance can partially be
explained by its relatively political and economic stability during the Arab
Spring as well as the diversification of its export base.
still there are major concerns over the economy's ability to meet an
increasing number of challenges. Growth has f'ailed to meet optimistic
forecasts and registered only 3.5(h in 2014-far from the 7-ll0lo annual levels
needed to employ a population of whom around one-third is aged l0-,)4.
Nearly a third of those aged 15-2g are unemployed, according: to world
Bank data". The state cannot afford to employ more people; public sector
salaries are equivalent to llgo of gross domestic product and 4g(lo oI
government revenue.
Clearly much remains to be done before Morocco's stability is assured.
However, given the Progress to date in laying a solid institutional foundation
there is good reason the country will be up to the challenges ahead.
Algerio
The analysis above found considerable differences between Algeria and
Jordan/Morocco. In contrast toJordan, Algeria is an over-achiever. 'fhat is
given the country's level of governance economic performance is consid-
erably higher than one would expect. In contrast to Morocco, Algeria has
very low levels of social capital. It is also clear that the country sufi'ers from
the lack of entrepreneurship and thus a dynamic private sector.
^Still, in recent years, the country has had the best economic perfornance
of countries in the autocratic group. Furthermore, despite the fact that
Algeria's immediate neighbor to the east, Tunisia, was the epicenter of the
Arab Spring and that ,ther Northern African countries, Egypt and Libya,
were to follow shortly after, Algeria remained immune from similar instances
of widespread public unrest calling for regime change. Is Algeria an
exceptional case and if so, what are the country's prospects for the future?
" World Inuestment Replrt 2014 (New York: Unitcd Nations, 2014).
"wirld Bank, "'l'he challcnge .l Yruth Inclusion in Morocc.," May 1,1, 2012.
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manufacturing sector with numerous competitive firms responding to
market forces. Instead industrial strateg'y was largely designedio p."rlr,r"
political balances in society by granting economic privileges to insider
elites. The result was to reinforce the natural tendency oi an oil based
economy to evolve into a rentier economyir.
In a classic rentier economy fashion, Algeria has failed to create a legal
and regulatory environment, to encourage entrepreneurship, prrvlte
investment, and economic diversification, all kev to long-term economic
growth and stability'1'. Large segments of the country's r*ill- and medium-
sized (SMEs) businesses face nearly insurmountable barriers to
profitability. They face a series of barriers including: access to markets,
funding from banks and obtaining permits.
The government has simply provided few incentives and much discour-
agement for potential private sector firms to undertake industrial and
service-related projects, activities that historically have been the key to
improved competitiveness and job creation"'. In the world Bank,s Doing
Business 2015 reportt', Algeria ranks 154 out of 189 countries in terms of
the ease of doing trusiness-behind most MENA countries. As an indication
of the obstacles faced by the private sector, Algeria ranked 17l out of lu!)
countries in the critical area of ease in gaining access to credit.
l\4ore importantly, however, falling oil prices are signaling a new era in
Algeria's economy". The oil price decline of 2014-15 is e*pe.ted to last for
at least several years. That being the case, Algeria will be forced to run large
and increasing budget deficits largely because during the period Lf
budgetary surpluses the government did not pursue a strategy to diversi$, its
revenue sources. Instead, the focus was on infrastructure construction and a
policy of untargeted price subsidies, all of which has caused operating
expenses to surge without changing the nature of the Algerian economy,,,.
. 
'"Lahcen Achy, Arab states Need Industrial poliq Reform, (washingt.n; carnegie,September 17,2013). http:,//carnegie-mcc.org/20tBlt)gttTiarab-states-nej-indurt.iul-p',,1i
cv-reform
, _ 
"clement M. Henry, 'Algeria's Agonies: ()il llent liffects in a Bunkcr state,', Journal ofNorthern African Studies g:2 Summer 2004, 6ti-Ul
"Robert^Springborg, "'I'he Precarious Economics of Arab Springs," suraiual 53:6
"Ease of Doing Business 2015 (washington: world nang 'zots) http:,//w1y1a,,.66ingbusi-
ness.orglrankings
- l:Pitr]ck Markey and Hamid ould Ahmed, 'Algeria walks Economic rightrope as oil
l-alls,'_'._Reuters,January 26, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/art icle/'2(\15/01/16/algeiia-ccon.,-
my-idUSL6N0V03OR20l50 126
"Lies Sahar, 'Algeria's Silver Lining," Sada, 
.]anuary 22, 2015. http://carnegie-
mec.org/2 015 / 0 I / 22 / algena-s-silver-lining
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There is no indication the government has plans on changing its
development strategy or undertaking- major econ-omic^and governance
,eforms. In fact the-government has drawn up a fresh lv-g-Iear plan for
2015-19, envisaging total capital spending of.262 billion dollarsn'.
The previous two fi.r"-yea, plans have set a worrying precedenl as the
record for project execution and resultant economic growth have been
poor, while'**tug" and comrption have been rife. The overall picture is
ir" 'of gross misallocation o1 ,".orrr."s. As shown earlier, (Table 1)
Algeria,s investment averaged 24.7010 of GDP from 2005-10 to 32.3 percent
irriott-t+. Still growth inc-reased by only 0.10/o (3.290 to 3.?0/0) as a result'
Many privateiusinesses, largely well connected elites have benefitted
from government spending on massive infrastructure projects. Again,
ho*e,ri, there has not been much of a trickle-down effect from these
expenditures due to the difficulties encountered by smaller private firms in
obLmirrg credit. Credit to the domestic private sector has averaged at only
about 160/o of GDP in recent years, which is significantly below the level in
most of the oil and gas producers in the MENA region'
Barring reforms, flummeting oil prices may ultimately produce regime
change. ifter the doUA oil priJe crash in 1986led to internal turmoil which
in tuL led to the iise of the now banned, "Front islamique du salut"os'
Conclusions
Forecasting events in the Middle East is a fool's errand. There do appear
to be some distinctive trends in the region taking the form of virtuous and
vicious circles. Both groups are diverging, with little indication that this
separation will abate-u.ryii-" soon. Countries such asJordan, Morocco,
urrd Aq"ru have not y"[ b""r, pulled into one soup or another yet all are
starting to show signs of their likely direction'
Orr"iun say witi some confidence thatJordan and Morocco are likely to
converge i., tire direction of the virtuous circle countries. They have laid a
solid foundation for sustaining prosperity. one could go even further and
speculate that the two may be onthe verge of a virhrous circle where a young'
,re*, and increasing influential entrepreneurial class helps reform minded
go,,r"rrr-"rrts push 
"through deeper t"fot-. thus producing higher rates of
Ecor,o*ic groith, employment ind thus the incentive for more reforms.
,,Hamid Ould Ahmed, "Algeria to Launch $ZOZ Un Five-Year Investment PlaL" Rauters,
e,rgo.i ZZ, 2014. http:/ /englisir.alarabiya.net/enlbusiness/economy/2014/08/27/Algeria-to-
lauich-2 62-bln-fi ve-year-investment-plan'html
'o"The Long Good-by," Afica ConfidentialJanuary 9, 2015'
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Still these countries will have to walk a narrow line between success and
failure. If sufficient jobs are not created fairly quickly each may find itself
overwhelmed with restless populations and the prospects for regime
change. In this regard, the one sure thing each monarchy has in its favor is
the fact that their populations have witnessed the cataclysmic events that
followed the populist-driven regime changes of the Arab Spring.
The Algerian situation is a completely different story. while the economy
has experienced some successes in the pas! the country,s state led
development model has clearly hit diminishing returns. Even before the
drop in oil prices the economy would have been hard pressed to stave off
eventual stagnation without undertaking major economic and governance
reforms. With the oil price drop it may be too late to move in that direction
even if the government were so inclined.
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